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RECENT CASES
THE EFFECT OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

IN THE INDICTMENT STAGE

A colored citizen convicted of murder in a state court in Texas by a
petit jury admittedly chosen without racial discrimination, sought a reversal of his conviction on the theory that colored citizens were purposefully discriminatcd against in the selection of the grand jury that indicted
him. It appeared that although 15.5 per cent of the population of the
county were Negroes, only one colored person had served as a juror on
any of the twenty-one consecutive grand juries called during the period
of five and one-half years preceding the indictment in the instant case.
The grand jury commissioners in explaining the situation stated that they
knew no available Negroes who were qualified; but they also stated that
they chose jurymen only from those persons with whom they were personally acquainted. The inescapable conclusion would appear to be that
Negroes are not those with whom white people are personally acquainted
in Texasl Held, that the conviction must be reversed because the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment had been violated through
discrimination in selecting the grand jury. Cassell v. State of Texas, -U.S.-,
70 Sup. Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed. 563 (1950). Justice Douglas did not participate,
and Justice Jackson was the only dissenter.
The decision indicated several schools of thought among the justices.
Reed, J., with whom Vinson, Ch. J., and Black, J., concurred, found discrimination in the fact that the jury commissioners failed to familiarize
themselves with the qualifications of eligible Negroes. Joined by Burton
and Minton, J. J., Frankfurter, J., found that discrimination existed by
reason of the fact that never more than one Negro had sat on twenty-one
consecutive grand juries, the jury commissioners believing mistakenly
that the mere presence of one Negro at some time or other satisfied the
constitutional prohibition against discrimination. These justices emphasized the unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions supporting the majority
decision.
Jackson, J., dissented on the theory that no substantial error had in
fact been committed, inasmuch as a fair trial was subsequently had. Clark,
J., was inclined to agree with the dissenter if it had been an original
issue, but because of reluctance to break with long established precedent
concurred with the majority, lining up in this respect with Justices Frankfurter, Minton and Burton.
The question before the court was not new. The first cases, decided
in 1879, reached similar conclusions upon like states of fact.' The following year, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a conviction
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where it was shown that in 1870 and 1880, there were respectively, 20,000
and 26,000 Negroes out of a total population of approximately 150,000
in Delaware, yet during the aforementioned decade not one Negro had
been. called for grand jury service. 2 This factual situation, said the Court,
was alone sufficient to warrant a finding of an unconstitutional discrimination.
Through the years the question did not rest, but constantly arose
and as constantly was affirmed. 3 In 1939 it was revealed in a Louisiana
case4 that during the 40 years from 1896 to 1936, no Negro had ever served
on a grand jury in the Parish of Saint John the Baptist, yet in the 1930
census the Negroes accounted for 49.3 per cent of the population in the
parish, 70 per cent of the Negroes being literate. In 1940 in a case originating in Texas, the United States Supreme Court declared another method
of keeping Negroes off grand juries unconstitutional: 5 between 1931 and
1936, 18 Negroes and 494 Whites had been summoned for grand jury
service in the county where the case arose, but by putting the Negroes'
names last and methodically selecting the first 12 names, only 5 Negroes
together with 379 White persons served during the aforementioned period
of time. Yet in that county the colored (half of whom were poll-taxpayers) accounted for 20 per cent of the population.
All the constitution requires is that color not be used as a criterion
for selecting a grand jury. 6 Proportional representation according to the
number of Negroes paying poll-taxes will not do, 7 the vice of such a system
being the use of a color line in any way as a determining factor. Color
as a keystone is unconstitutional. 8 The burden of proof is on the defend9
ant in a criminal case to allege and prove the existence of discrimination.
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Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567 (1880).

Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 1 Sup. Ct. 625, 27 L. Ed. 354 (1883) a statute
declared unconstitutional for denying Negrocs the right to sit on grand juries;
Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 20 Sup. Ct. 687, 44 L. Ed. 839 (1900); Rogers v.
Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 24 Sup. Ct. 257, 48 L. Ed. 417 (1904); Norris v. Alahama,
294 U.S. 587, 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935) a Scottsboro hoy; Hollins v.
Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 55 Sup. Ct. 784, 79 L. Ed. 1500 (1936); Hale v. Kentucky,
303 U.S. 613, 58 Sup. Ct. 753, 82 L. Ed. 1050 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S.
354, 59 Sup. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 61 Sup.
Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 1159 (1942):
Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76 (1948).
Pierre v. Louisiana, supra note 4.
Smith v. Texas,, 311 U.S. 128, 61 Sup. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940).
See notes 1, 2, 3 supra.
Cassell v. Texas, -U.S.-, 70 Sup. Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed. 563 (1950).
See notes 1, 2, 3, 7 supra.
In the following cases the defendant failed to prove the discrimination: Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 Sup. Ct. 904, 40 L. Ed. 1075 (1896) ; Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 16 Sup. Ct. 900, 40 L. Ed. 1082 (1896); Murray v. Louisiana,
163 U.S. 101, 16 Sup. Ct. 990, 41 L. Ed. 87 (1896); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S.
213, 18 Sup. Ct. 583, 42 L. Ed. 1012 (1898); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519, 23
Sup. Ct. 402, 47 L. Ed. 572 (1903); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426,
23 Sup. Ct. 513, 47 L. Ed. 882 (1903); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 26 Sup. Ct.
338, 50 L. Ed. 497 (1906); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 29 Sup. Ct. 393, 53
L. Ed. 512 (1908); Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161, 30 Sup. Ct. 640, 54
L. Ed. 980 (1910); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 65 Sup, Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692
(1945).
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Upon a surface analysis, no substantial error was committed in the
instant case, for it was admitted that the defendant had a fair trial and
that no discrimination was practiced in the selection of the petit jury.
If the case had arisen in a state with a comparatively small Negro population, like Wyoming, few would take issue with the dissent; in fact it is unlikely that the question would have been raised. The United States
Supreme Court since 1880 has considered 21 different cases in which
such discrimination has been asserted, and all 21 cases originated in southern or border states. 10
The conclusion of the majority represents the repeated holding of
the U. S. Supreme Court; eight times" in the last fifteen years the highest
tribunal arrived at the same conclusion under similar states of fact. The
decision appears sound in the light of judicial history, and is representative
of the particular regard which the Supreme Court has in recent years
manifested toward personal rights.
HERBERT SAUL ROVNER.
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See notes 3, 7, 9 supra.
See note 3, cases 4-10 supra.

